The purpose of this paper is to present an example which provides an affirmative answer to the question. We shall use the model and notation of Shafer's paper to which the reader is referred for further explanation.
SHAFER'S MODEL AND EXAMPLE
A game with side payments F = (A, V) consists of a finite set of agents A and a superadditive real valued function V defined on the power set of A, and such that V(4) =0. Each S c A is a coalition and V(S) is the "payoff" which that coalition can guarantee its members. The Shapley Value (see [10] ) of a game F attempts to define a "fair division" of payoffs by assigning to each player the expected value of the incremental gain he brings to all possible coalitions, assuming they are all equally likely to form. Imputations are assigned to players according to the rule [7] and Schafer [9] .
